In order to understand the nature of the defect in moral imbeciles it is necessary to make a short digression, and to consider what are the mental factors concerned in conduct. It is now generally recognized that the mainspring of most, if not all, human conduct is to be found in certain instincts or impulses. Many of these date from very early human, or even from prehuman times, and are therefore deeply ingrained. The instincts which have been described are numerous, and although it is probable that most, if not all, are modifications of a single primary one, namely, that directed towards the perpetuation of the species, it is convenient to differentiate, and we may, for our present purpose, make a brief allusion to four-namely, the sexual, combabive, acquisitive and self-displaying.
Originally these instincts were no sooner aroused than immediate action followed. The sexual instinct led to rape and promiscuous sexual intercourse; the combative to assault and homicide; the acquisitive to theft and robbery; the self-displaying to boastful lying. Even to-day in many barbarous races we find these primitive instincts still manifesting themselves in their original primitive way, that is, in immediatQ action regardless of any secondary considerations. In the untutored child born in a civilized community we still find them tending to the same immediate expression. Now if we imagine man as he existed at a very early stage of social evolution, we shall admit that a time would very soon come when such unrestrained response to these instincts would bring him into conflict with superior force and lead to painful reprisals. The community, whether it consisted of an enlarged family connected by blood ties, or of an assemblage of such families, would realize that certain acts were inimical to its safety and well-being; consequently such acts could not be tolerated, and stringent rules would be made prohibiting them. The individual would speedily realize that not merely his personal comfort, but even his life, might be dependent upon the observance of these laws, and such intellectual perception would act as a restraint upon his instinctive tendencies. The gradual evolution of society would tend to increase these prohibitions and to impose more and more restrictions upon instinctive conduct, with the result that conduct would become more deliberate and less impuisive.
It is clear that the quality of mind which is necessary to enable the individual to survive as society evolves embraces much more than the mere intelligence needed to adapt acts to the requirements of the moment. It necessitates an ability to visualize the consequences of an act before that act is committed, to project the act mentally into the future, to compare such projection with the law and codes laid down by society, and to restrain the act in accordance with the judgment thus formed. In short, since on the whole, success in life is dependent upon ability to conform to the requirements of society, the individual who would succeed must be able to look beyond the needs of the day and to make plans for the future, to map a course as well as to -steer one, to forgo present gratification for the sake of future advantage, and so to co-ordinate his conduct that if he does not actually achieve success at all events he deserves to do so. Further, the individual must be able to bring these qualities of foresight, judgment, and control to bear upon his conduct amid the exigencies of life and often under the influence of profound emotion.
No doubt the psychological processes which make up this higher mental level are very complex. It is, however, convenient to speak of them as if they were a single faculty, and to this mental quality we may give the term "wisdom." Dr. Mercier defined wisdom as "tthat intellectual quality that guides and governs the higher and more comprehensive phases of conduct, that regulates the main business of life in adaptation to circumstances, that teaches us how to act, so that in the long run and on balance our lives will be successful." I may remark that since wisdom would possess a very great survival value, it would tend to be perpetuated, whilst those individuals in whom it was lacking would tend to be eliminated.
It is now necessary to allude to another attribute of mind which plays a great part in the regulation of conduct-namely, what is known as moral, or perhaps better, social sense. Moral sense is sometimes termed " conscience," and it is often assumed that this is an innate faculty, a still small voice, which provides its possessor with an infallible guide as to what is right and wrong. I need hardly say that this view is incorrect; the time at my disposal, however, will only enable me to give the briefest sketch of its psychological nature and evolution. The normal human mind is very acutely sensitive to the approbation and disapprobation of public opinion. To a certain extent this perception is an intellectual one, based upon the fear of consequences, but it also seems to have an emotional basis, being closely related to those selfregarding sentiments of the individual which we speak of as self-respect. When primitive man had arrived at the stage of regulating his conduct through wisdom, that is through the intellectual perception that it was wise to do so, the approbation following such restraint would favour the evolution of his self-respect, and there would gradually be developed a sentiment regarding such acts. Conduct in accordance with the customs of the community would come to be regarded not only as wise but as right; conduct opposed to those customs as not only unwise but wrong. Such a sentiment in course of time would be extended to all new laws and customs which were supported by public opinion, or which were enunciated by individuals whose character or station made an appeal to the imagination or respect of the populace, with the result that ideals of conduct would gradually be developed which would not only act as a restraint to primitive instincts, but would possess an actual impelling force of their own.
There can be little doubt that such moral or social sentiment lies at the root of our more advanced Western civilization. Based primarily upon the desire for approbation, self-esteem, and the tender emotions, as we see it to-day it is the quality of mind which enables man to feel that he has obligations to society, which makes him sensible of the ideals of honour and honesty, of compassion and chivalry, of patriotism and altruism, and which not only restrains the individual from doing wrong, but impels him to do right.
It has thus come about that although instincts still form the mainspring of human conduct, impelling man to definite ends which are favourable to the perpetuation of the race, the mode by which these ends are now attained, the manner in whigh these instincts are manifested, has undergone a great modification. Amongst civilized peoples the sexual instinct is no longer manifested in rape and promiscuous intercourse, but within the bonds of wedlock. The combative instinct no longer finds expression in assault and slaying of our opponent, but in forbearance, or if this is impossible, in legal process. The acquisitive instinct, whilst still operative, is restrained within the law of the land: and the self-displaying instinct within the canons sanctioned by good taste. In short, we may say that although instinct still directs to tne same terminus, wisdom and moral sense have resulted in a considerable variation in the mode of conveyance and route followed. Conformity to the regulations as to conveyance and route prescribed by society constitutes correct social conduct; non-conformity to these regulations constitutes misconduct.
Such, briefly stated, is the manner in which the regulation of conduct was gradually evolved in the race. A very similar process takes place in the development of the individual. The new-born child has neither wisdom nor moral sense; he has, however, many deeply ingrained impulses to action, and in his early years these tend to be expressed in their original primitive way. This is so far recognized. by the law of England that a child under the age of 7 is deemed incapable of committing a crime. In the normal child, as a result of precept, example, admonition and punishment, there is first gradually evolved the intellectual perception that misconduct does not pay. At a somewhat later age the development of moral sense becomes superadded, the child acquires a sentiment of his relationship to society, of social obligation; and later of still higher moral and social ideals.
In some instances misconduct would appear to be the result of very pronounced or even abnormal impulses; speaking generally however, misconduct is probably due to a defect of the qualities we have mentionednamely, wisdom and moral sense. Of these two, defect of wisdom seems to me the more important. There are many people with a decidedly weak moral sense, and although this may result in occasional criminal acts, it does not in itself lead to persistent misconduct, because, wisdom being present, they are able to realize the personal disadvantage of such misconduct. If however a person is deficient in wisdom as well, that is, if in addition to an inability to appreciate ideals and the rightness or wrongness of acts, he is unable to learn from experience and to realize that the commission of vicious and criminal acts is to his disadvantage, then he will be deprived of all restraining influence, he will beincapable of conforming to the standard set up by society, and he will be a persistent and incorrigible criminal.
It is evident that these two mental qualities stand on a higher developmental plane than does ordinary intelligence. As a result of ordinary intelligence a person may be able to acquire scholastic information, he may possess a good range of knowledge, may be quick at repartee, full of wit and a brilliant conversationalist; he may be able to regulate his acts in accordance with the requirements of the moment, and even to do so with considerable cunning and skill; but he may still be lacking in any sense of the rightness or wrongness of those acts, he may be incapable of forming a judgment as to their ultimate effect, and unable to co-ordinate his conduct to his ultimate advantage. Such defect is truly mental, and I am of the opinion that it is the defect meant in the definition of a moral imbecile.
There can be no doubt that persons thus defective require care, supervision and control for their own protection or for the protection of others, and that consequently they conform to the statutory definition of feeble-minded persons. Strictly speaking therefore moral imbeciles could be certified as feeble-minded, but the idea is so prevalent that feeble-mindedness connotes a fairly obvious defect of intelligence, that in actual practice certification under this definition is usually impossible; it was owing to this restricted and erroneous conception that a new definition was rendered necessary.
The definition says that the mental defect must be permanent, and we have now to consider this. This word has given rise to considerable difficulty and its omission has even been suggested. I think, however, that it is really necessary to define the class. As I need hardly point out, the higher mental qualities of wisdom and moral sense are not innate, they are largely dependent upon training. The child who is brought up in an atmosphere of vice and selfishness is not likely to develop any ideals of social obligation or of the rights of anyone but himself; similarly the child who is never punished or in any way made to experience the consequences of his acts, whose whole surroundings are those of thriftless improvidence, and of complete disregard for the future, is little likely to acquire much wisdom. No doubt in many children such defect of training lies at the root of vicious and even criminal conduct. Further, even where the environment is satisfactory, there are some children who are late in developing these higher qualities, just as some children are late in developing somatic functions. Until these controlling qualities of mind have been evolved the child's behaviour necessarily remains self-seeking and anti-social. On the other hand there are certain cases in which, in spite of the most careful training and the due lapse of time, these qualities never appear. Such children are innately lacking in the potentiality for the development of these faculties, and this lack is permanent. These are the true moral imbeciles and it was to differentiate this innate defect of potentiality from defect due to delay or to faulty training and environment that the word permanent was used.
The next term of the definition, namely, strong vicious or criminal propensities, does not usually give rise to much practical difficulty. Obviously, we have no means of judging what propensities exist until they have become manifest as conduct, so that to establish the presence of strong propensities we must have evidence of the repeated commission of vicious or criminal acts. Such evidence is usually abundant, indeed it is because of it that the suspicion of moral imbecility is raised, and the only difficulty which is likely to arise in a particular case is whether the misconduct committed comes within the statutory definition. In the case of criminal offences there can rarely be any difficulty, for this term has a tolerably well recognized meaning; the term " vice," however, is an exceedingly elastic one and calls for a few remarks. Misconduct in the sexual sphere is that which is likely to cause the chief trouble, and in actual practice the question resolves itself into this: Can the amateur or professional prostitute be said to evince such strong vicious propensities as to come within this term of the definition? My own view is that prostitution in itself does not amount to the viciousness intended, and that the criterion must be, not the actual sexual immorality, but the attendant circumstances. Thus, in the case of a woman pursuing her calling in what may be termed a decent, respectable manner, I should say the offence was not vicious within the meaning of the act. On the other hand, in the case of one openly and persistently flaunting herself in an offensive and outrageous manner, or of one guilty of the indiscriminate spreading of disease to all and sundry, I should say that it did amount to such vicious conduct.
It must be remembered, however, that vicious conduct must be coupled with permanent mental defect to bring the individual within the statutory definition of a moral imbecile, and, as a matter of fact, it is usually only where there is such defect, that viciousness, as above described, will be found; since the non-defective woman has the wit to see that it does not pay flagrantly to violate the law and outrage public decency or to spread disease.
The next term to be considered is from an early age. These words are admittedly very indefinite, and they have consequently been interpreted very differently. Some persons would take them to mean infancy or childhood; on the other hand the age of 17 has been accepted by the Courts as complying with the definition. I am of the opinion that their real purpose is to differ-entiate between a mental defect which is innate and one which is acquired subsequently to normal developinent, and consequently by " an early age " is meant the age at which conduct usually begins to show itself. In most instances defective regulation of conduct will be apparent during the years of childhood, and as a matter of fact in most moral imbeciles there is a history of intractability, defiance of authority and acts of misconduct dating from the first decade of life. It is to be remarked, however, that many instincts may not attain their full evolution until considerably later than this, and that the full regtilation of conduct may not become necessary until the individual gets away from the restraint of home and is called upon to face the world more or less on his own responsibility; a defect which up to that time has been latent may then become patent. For this reason I think that we are justified in regarding the period of adolescence as constituting " an early age," and as a matter of fact in quite a considerable proportion of cases which I regard as true moral imbecility it is not until after the age of 12 that any serious misconduct begins to show itself.
The last term of the definition is on which punishmentt has had little or nio deterrent effect. The question arising here is the meaning of the word punishment. Must it be punishment inflicted by the law, or will that administered in the orthodox way by a parenb or guardian suffice ? There are some who contend that it must be legal punishment, and that a person cannot be brought within the definition of a moral imbecile unlesshehas been sentenced by the Court. I think this view is wrong. It seems to me that the object of introducing this qualification is to differentiate the normal from the abnormal,and to make it additionally clear that the class to whom the term " moral imbecile " is applied is that in whom misconduct is due to mental defect. The fact of misconduct being or not being deterred by punishment does form a very important criterion by which we may distinguish the normal from the abnormal. For in the non-defective person punishment, provided it is adequate to the offence, will suffice to convince the offender that misconduct does not pay, and he will therefore realize that it is against his interest to repeat it. The moral imbecile, on the other band, is lacking in the wisdom to appreciate this, with the result that for him punishment has little or no deterrent effect. I hold therefore, that the infliction of such punishment as would suffice to deter the ordinary normal child from a repetition of the offence would be quite adequate and would fulfil this term of the definition. In the normal child it is rare for more than parental punishment to be required to do this. It is thus clear that this term of definition is much more than a legal technicality which must be complied with; it is a touchstone of great importance, which must always be applied before we can diagnose moral imbecility. I mention this because I have seen persons who, owing to repeated offences, had been thought to be moral imbeciles; but they were the spoilt darlings of doting parents, and they had never been adequately punished. Consequently, not only had they not suffered any ill-effects or even inconvenience from their misconduct, but they had actually derived advantage therefrom, so much so that non-persistence would have been more indicative of lack of wisdom than persistence. The infliction of a punishment to fit the crime, and the enforcement of a rigorous discipline led eventually to a complete alteration in their behaviour. We see then that although the statutory definition is made up of several distinct terms, these are nevertheless largely complementary to one another, and taken as a whole they define the moral imbecile with considerable accuracy.
DESCRIPTION.
Physically, moral imbeciles are usually well-developed and present none of the signs so commonly seen in ordinary aments. Most-of them are quite pleasant looking persons, indeed not a few are unusually engaging and attractive. Similarly with regard to their intellectual attainments and ordinary intelligence, moral imbeciles present no distinguishing features. They will converse well and even brilliantly upon the ordinary topics of the day, whilst many of them are so plausible in their speech and so apt at repartee as to appear exceptionally clever and astute. Although their whole conduct and the application of special mental tests reveal defect of judgment and wisdom, the physician who attempts to arrive at a diagnosis by means of the ordinary tests of scholastieproficiency will assuredly fail, whilst the person who trusts to physiognomical expression will have a rude awakening when he learns the history of their misdeeds. It would serve no purpose to describe the crimes they miay commit, which range from petty pilfering to homicide. The commonest are theft, embezzlement, the passing of worthless cheques, the obtaining of goods by false pretences or other forms of fraud, incorrigible lying, sexual offences and assaults. I do not think I have ever known a moral imbecile who was not a confirmed liar, and not infrequently one meets with that artistic form of lying known as " pseudologia phantastica." With regard to their crimes it is worthy of note tbhat in spite of their cunning in making elaborate plans, they will often neglect some simple precaution which could hardly be omitted by a person of average common sense, and this omission leads to their speedy detection. As Mercier said, "they are merely clever fools." Speaking generally, we may say that they are characterized by complete selfishness, want of affection, and an utter disregard of the rights or feelings of other people; a lack of any real shame or remorse for the acts committed, even when these are of the most brutal and fiendish nature; an intolerance of discipline and authority; a complete disregard of public opinion and an incapacity to appreciate any such ideals as honour and honbesty, justice and probity, social and patriotic obligation, a want of the sense of responsibility, and an utter incapacity to profit by experience.
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS.
Although the class with which we are dealing has been defined by statute for the past seven years, experience shows that there is still great misconception and ignorance regarding it. There are judges, magistrates, and even medical men who appear to think that-mind embraces nothing higher than the ordinary common intelligence by virtue of which an individual is enabled to adapt his acts to the requirements of the moment. If he can do this, and if he has a fair scholastic knowledge and can converse intelligently, he cannot possibly, according to them, be defective. I have frequently heard the remark passed, regarding a person whose life history was a record of continuous crime, and about whose defect I had not the slightest doubt, "How can he be defective, he's as 'cute as a needle? " Persons of this kind entirely fail to recognize the very existence of moral imbecility, and I think that public officials who cannot do this after the lapse of seven years should be superannuated. On the other hand, there are persons who appear to think that every individual who is guilty of repeated misconduct must of necessity be a moral imbecile, and this view is hardly any less pernicious than the former one; for it not only tends to abuse of the Act, but may inflict serious harm upon those whose condition is thus wrongly diagnosed.
Diagnosis is admittedly a matter of very considerable difficulty, although if we take care to see that each term in the statutory definition is fulfilled this difficulty will be much lessened; it may however be useful to enumerate briefly the conditions which more or less simulate moral imbecility and from which it has to be distinguished.
The first of these is ordinary delinquency. There is no doubt that persons exist whose moral sense is weak, but who nevertheless know that certain acts are wrong; they are also fully aware that if they commit these acts and are found out they will suffer. The chance of detection, however, may seem so small and the advantage resulting from the act so considerable, that they deliberately take the risk. This is ordinary delinquency, and it differs from moral imbecility in that the misconduct is not persistent and continuous, but occasional only. In the class known as instinctive or habitual criminals, in which misconduct is persistent, so that the individual shows an utter incapacity to run straight, and is no sooner liberated from imprisonment than he is engaged in fresh depredations, there is primna facie evidence of defective judgment, and as a matter of fact most of such instinctive criminals, if not all, are in reality moral imbeciles.
The second class of case is that in which the development of the conttolling] faculties is delayed. This may occur under two conditions, one of which is intrinsic and the other extrinsic: I will allude to these separately.
As I have already mentioned, the qualities of wisdom and moral sense represent the latest achievements in the mental evolution of the race, and they are similarly the latest to appear in the evolution of the individual. No doubt individual differences in this respect are dependent upon race, social class and family antecedents, and whilst most children have evolved sufficiently to regulate conduct by the end of the first decade, cases occur in which this does not happen until the later years of adolescence. Until this time the person's behaviour will necessarily tend to be unregulated, selfish, and antisocial, and the condition may well be thought to be one of moral imbecility. In most cases a close inquiry into the behaviour will show that although such persons are selfish and prone to miscoduct, this misconduct is neither so persistent nor so outrageous, as in the moral imbecile; nevertheless the resemblance may be sufficiently close to make diagnosis impossible for a time. Time is the only real test, and in view of the possibility of this condition, the greatest care should be taken in certifying under the Act until the later years of adolescence have been reached.
A similar condition of delay may result from defective training or a vicious and criminal environment. Many minor examples of this kind, in the shape of juvenile hooligans, were seen during the war, and they were generally attributed to the absence of discipline owing to the father being away. More marked instances came from the slums and the nomadic population. If such persons can be removed from their adverse surroundings sufficiently early and be placed under firm discipline and good moral influence, there is a probability that they may acquire control and become law-abiding citizens, as is shown by the record of such philanthropic institutions as the Church Army and Dr. Barnardo's Homes.
The third class of case is that inwhich misconduct is due to acqtuired mental disorder. Cases of this kind are very frequent, and it is particularly necessary to bear them in mind when confronted with a supposed moral imbecile. The mental disorder may range from a temporary, and comparatively slight, disturbance of equilibrium to one which is severe and incurable, but whilst it lasts misconduct may be very marked. For instance, such lapses are by no means rare in neurotic youths and girls after exhausting illnesses, or even during the physiological epochs of puberty and adolescence without any definite illness. They may also occur in consequence of a repressed complex following some psychic shock or emotional experience; or from a condition of conscious mental agitation due to the individual being in a state of disharmony with his environment, such for instance as having been put to an occupation which is thoroughly distasteful to him. When more pronounced, these conditions constitute adolescent insanity. I regret that the time available does not allow me to do more than merely mention these conditions, particularly because I am convinced that adolescent instability and adolescent insanity are very prevalent and important causes of misconduct, and that persons suffering from them are frequently thought to be moral imbeciles. Such an error would usually be prevented by a careful study of the personal history.
Another condition to which I may refer is that of brain injury. During the recent war, in a very large number of soldiers the brain was injured by a, severe gunshot or other wound. Of those who survived a small proportion developed some form of psychosis, and in a small percentage of these it took the form of a complete alteration of the moral character. Young men who had previously been steady, honest, industrious, sober, and in every way perfectly well conducted, became exactly the reverse. They became careless and indifferent to the customary routine, disrespectful and defiant to those in authority, lazy, drunken, addicted to lying, theft and other offences. There was, in fact, such a complete alteration in their whole disposition and behaviour as to call forth remark from all those who had known them before the injury. In every respect their conduct resembled that of a moral imbecile.
Lastly, I may refer to cases of cerebral lesions due to disease. I have occasionally had sent to me a youth or girl who had been diagnosed as a moral imbecile on account of persistent lying, thieving, and a marked alteration of conduct and disposition. Careful examination revealed the physical signs of early general paralysis.
In conclusion, let me say that no one can be more conscious than I am of the incomplete manner in which I have dealt with this subject, which is one of great magnitude and importance. I trust, however, that I have said enough to form a basis for your consideration and discussion.
DISCUSSION.
Dr. STODDART differed from the opinion that the moral sense arose in mnan through the inheritance of an acquired instinct and that it was instilled anew into every child by education. Rather would he regard the moral sense as being an innate instinct developed in a gregarious animal through natural selection by the survival of the fittest. Cases of moral imbecility were either individuals otherwise normal who never developed a moral sense, habitual criminals for whom no treatment was of any avail, and a third class of patients who began to commit immoral acts as soon as puberty was reached. This last class required special recognition because their nmoral defect was not perm-lanent and could be cured by psycho-analysis. Such patients revealed complexes of various kinds, for instance, a desire for power which was felt to be lacking and which was gratified by stealing objects symbolizing power, or by boastful lying. Intellectually such patients were perfectly normal and being curable should not be treated under the Mental Deficiency Act.
Dr. SHRUBSALL agreed that the basis of miioral deficiency was a failure of developient in the individual of altruistic master sentiments whether from undue strength of the egoistic or sex instincts or from weakness of the herd instinct perhaps coupled with a bad environment in the plastic period of life. The actual definition showed the disadvantages of hard-and-fast legal definitions in clinical matters, and difficulties arose with regard to each term. Some would require evidence of defective conduct to be shown fronm early infancy, others would be satisfied with evidence dating from adolescence. The word " permanent" introduced complications of another kind; if there was any truth in the statements that by means of psychotherapy, whether in the form of psycho-analysis, or otherwise, hidden springs of trouble mlight be tapped and the psychic energy released to more normal routes of operation, the defect in such cases could not be regarded as permanent. Who was prepared to say with the brief opportunities for diagnosis available to most certifying officers which cases could be relieved and which could not ? It was unnecessary to be required to make so detailed a prognosis. Surely it was sufficient to show there was some mental defect and that because of this the subject needed care and control for his own protection or the protection of others. Then with regard to the terms " vicious " and " criminal propensities circumstances altered cases and the subject might reasonably often deem he had made a good bargain ill sacrificing a hypothetical future for an immediate desire. If the circumstances were such that the sacrifice was manifestly absurd the subject could without difficulty be termed feeble-minded. Punishimient was another stumbling block in the path. What a certifying officer, teacher, magistrate or parent might think was punishment, and so a prospective deterrent, mnight appear in a quite different light to the subject; among s-ome groups of boys to be punished was regarded as an honour and as admitting them to some degree of precedence in their little groups. In this case the partial herd regarding this as an honour the instinctive force would be acting not as a deterrent but as an encourageimment to conduct which would be regarded as vicious by other partial herds. All these difficulties would be avoided if the Mental Deficiency Act had contained one definition only: the first half of the definition of the feeble-minded person. German law did this, saying " Those who do not possess the power of considering the results of their actions are termed ilmbeciles " and leaving it no more precisely defined. Such a change also got rid of the undoubted overlap between the definitions of idiot and imbecile and of imbecile and feeble-minded person. Turning to another aspect of the matter no one could rightfully give a certificate of moral imbecility unless he had acted in the spirit of the old Puritan who seeing a criminal going to execution said " there but for the grace of God goes John Bradford." It was easy for them to say that a person had views of conduct which differed from their own; it was less easy to say that they would have acted differently had they had that person's circumstances to contend with and only his upbringing behind them. The herd instinct only gave its sanction to the acts of the immediate herd so that where persons were brought up to profit by theft, was it a sign of abnormality that they should steal; if they were brought up with no privacy and in an atmosphere of loose sexual relationships was it abnormal that they should find prostitution as easy mode of life ? Yet there were sheltered individuals who would call all prostitutes moral imbeciles. To be evidence of abnormal mentality the conduct complained of must have been abnornial in the surroundings of the subject. Hence it was much easier to certify as to deficiency in subjects of the educated classes. Dr. Mercier had described the moral imbecile as a clever fool; in so far as he was a fool he was certifiable as feebleminded, but the true moral imbecile was no fool. In his own eyes and often in all appearance he was successful, he had got on by sacrificing others to himself. There were all grades of this tendency but ethically at least the line was crossed when the subject sought the imnlmlediate gratification of his own primitive instincts regardless of all consequences to any but himself however much his intelligence might enable him to keep within the four corners of the law. Such were not included even by the special definition. A second generation who had not had their wits sharpened by struggles in early life often showed the tendencies to self-seeking without the necessary intellectual balance and thus proved failures. Hence the proverb " clogs to clogs in three generations." A simplification of the definitions in any amendmnent of the Mental Deficiency Act would be welcome.
